research
My research sits at the intersection of virtue ethics, philosophy of psychology, and AI ethics, united by a concern for how individuals and institutions shape moral character. Within virtue ethics, I explore the formation of character in educational, professional, and cultural contexts. I view pedagogy as a fundamentally moral endeavor—one that cultivates not just knowledge but also the intellectual virtues that guide how students think and live. My current book project, The Cost of Convenience, extends this focus to contemporary culture, arguing that convenience-driven habits erode the practices necessary for developing practical wisdom.
In the philosophy of psychology, I examine the emotional and moral dimensions of trauma, disorientation, and moral injury. Drawing from Aristotelian and theological sources, I analyze how affective experiences like guilt, shame, and betrayal shape agency and character. Much of my work in this area focuses on contexts such as military life, healthcare, and refugee communities, where I argue that moral injury cannot be reduced to psychological harm alone but must be understood in relation to disrupted moral commitments and fractured identities.
My work in AI ethics builds on these concerns by exploring how digital technologies affect the development of virtue. I critique the way AI systems—especially in education and professional settings—encourage instrumental reasoning at the expense of practical deliberation and how their chronic use might be malformative. Rather than framing AI ethics around compliance or human-likeness, I advocate for a teleological approach that evaluates AI in light of the ends it should serve. Across these domains, I aim to show that the cultivation of virtue is not peripheral to contemporary life, but central to our shared moral and intellectual future. See below for some current projects not yet published.
In the philosophy of psychology, I examine the emotional and moral dimensions of trauma, disorientation, and moral injury. Drawing from Aristotelian and theological sources, I analyze how affective experiences like guilt, shame, and betrayal shape agency and character. Much of my work in this area focuses on contexts such as military life, healthcare, and refugee communities, where I argue that moral injury cannot be reduced to psychological harm alone but must be understood in relation to disrupted moral commitments and fractured identities.
My work in AI ethics builds on these concerns by exploring how digital technologies affect the development of virtue. I critique the way AI systems—especially in education and professional settings—encourage instrumental reasoning at the expense of practical deliberation and how their chronic use might be malformative. Rather than framing AI ethics around compliance or human-likeness, I advocate for a teleological approach that evaluates AI in light of the ends it should serve. Across these domains, I aim to show that the cultivation of virtue is not peripheral to contemporary life, but central to our shared moral and intellectual future. See below for some current projects not yet published.
"The Boundaries of Moral Injury: A Philosopher's Perspective"
In this paper I provide a philosophical analysis of moral injury in order to provide theoretical and conceptual clarity of the construct. I argue that clearly defining the boundaries of moral injury will ensure the integrity of the concept as it is considered outside a clinical setting and beyond the scope of the soldier.
"Moral Injury & Virtue in the Workplace"
Recently Abadal & Potts (2022) have argued that the conditions for Chronic Moral Injury (CH-MI) are rife in capitalistic corporate settings—those in which practices are often marginalized by Weberian managers. Though this concept of CH-MI clarifies how moral injury can be systemic, there is still much more to be said about the experience of acute moral injury in the workplace and what makes workers most suspectable to it. In this paper we will explore the role of the virtues in protecting against or exacerbating acute moral injury in the workplace. In effect, this paper will provide a conceptual framework for further empirical exploration of the interaction between character and potentially morally injurious experiences (PMIEs) at work.
“The Deconstruction of Practices and the (Im)possibility of Virtue: The Cost of Delegating Skilled Work to AI”
In this paper, I argue that the “deconstruction of practices” will make the acquisition of virtue an impossibility for future practitioners if the work delegated to AI could be described as a “core skill” of any particular practice. Thus, the use of artificial intelligence (AI) poses an imminent threat to the character development within professional trades, trades which require practical reason for their excellence. I will consider journalism as an example of the impact that utilization of ChatGPT or similar AI could have on the deconstruction of practices. I specifically consider journalism here because the direct and deleterious effects of ChatGPT are, perhaps, most pronounced and obvious.
In this paper I provide a philosophical analysis of moral injury in order to provide theoretical and conceptual clarity of the construct. I argue that clearly defining the boundaries of moral injury will ensure the integrity of the concept as it is considered outside a clinical setting and beyond the scope of the soldier.
"Moral Injury & Virtue in the Workplace"
Recently Abadal & Potts (2022) have argued that the conditions for Chronic Moral Injury (CH-MI) are rife in capitalistic corporate settings—those in which practices are often marginalized by Weberian managers. Though this concept of CH-MI clarifies how moral injury can be systemic, there is still much more to be said about the experience of acute moral injury in the workplace and what makes workers most suspectable to it. In this paper we will explore the role of the virtues in protecting against or exacerbating acute moral injury in the workplace. In effect, this paper will provide a conceptual framework for further empirical exploration of the interaction between character and potentially morally injurious experiences (PMIEs) at work.
“The Deconstruction of Practices and the (Im)possibility of Virtue: The Cost of Delegating Skilled Work to AI”
In this paper, I argue that the “deconstruction of practices” will make the acquisition of virtue an impossibility for future practitioners if the work delegated to AI could be described as a “core skill” of any particular practice. Thus, the use of artificial intelligence (AI) poses an imminent threat to the character development within professional trades, trades which require practical reason for their excellence. I will consider journalism as an example of the impact that utilization of ChatGPT or similar AI could have on the deconstruction of practices. I specifically consider journalism here because the direct and deleterious effects of ChatGPT are, perhaps, most pronounced and obvious.
